Weimar & Nazi Germany 1918–39

One reason support for the Nazis increased was the Great Depression. After the Wall Street Crash in October 1929, American banks recalled the loans¹ that German industry had relied on since the Dawes Plan of 1924. Businesses closed and unemployment rose to about six million by 1932. Chancellor Brüning, governing through President Hindenburg's emergency powers under Article 48, raised taxes and cut wages and unemployment benefits, which made him deeply unpopular. This mattered because desperate voters lost faith in the Weimar parties² that seemed unable to solve the crisis, and turned to extremist parties promising action. The Nazis offered 'work and bread', and their number of seats in the Reichstag rose from 12 in 1928 to 107 in September 1930 and 230 in July 1932³.

A second reason was the SA and the fear of communism. The Communist Party (KPD) also grew during the Depression, and many middle-class Germans, farmers and industrialists feared a communist revolution that would take away their property and businesses. The SA, which had around 400,000 members by 1932, fought communists in street battles and broke up their meetings. This made the Nazis appear strong and disciplined⁴, the party most able to protect Germany from communism, which won them votes and also donations from some wealthy businessmen.

A third reason was Nazi propaganda and the appeal of Hitler⁵. Joseph Goebbels ran a modern propaganda campaign with posters, rallies, radio and films, using simple slogans that targeted different groups: workers were promised jobs, farmers higher prices and the middle classes order. In the 1932 presidential election Hitler used aeroplanes to speak at rallies in many cities in a single day, presenting himself as a strong leader who would overturn the Treaty of Versailles and restore Germany's greatness. Earlier, in 1929, the Nazis had joined Alfred Hugenberg in campaigning against the Young Plan, which gave them publicity in his many newspapers. As a result, the Nazis could reach voters across Germany, and Hitler won 37% of the vote in the second round⁶ of the presidential election against Hindenburg.

These factors were linked⁷. The Depression created the conditions in which Germans were desperate for change, but it was propaganda and the SA that persuaded them that the Nazis, rather than the Communists, were the answer.

I agree with Interpretation 2 to a large extent, but mainly for the later 1930s¹. It is right that the Nazis did not win over all young people, and that enthusiasm fell once the Hitler Youth became compulsory. However, Interpretation 1 is also convincing for many young Germans, especially in the early years of the regime, so the best view is that attitudes changed over time.

Interpretation 2 is convincing when it says that membership 'became an obligation'. The Hitler Youth Law of 1936² made the Hitler Youth the official youth organisation of the state, and other youth groups, such as most Catholic youth groups, were gradually closed down. In 1939 membership was made compulsory. My knowledge supports the claim that this reduced enthusiasm: many teenagers who were forced to join were less committed than the volunteers of the early 1930s, and some members complained that activities became repetitive, with long hours of drill and political lessons. As the Hitler Youth grew to millions of members, there were not enough experienced leaders, so groups were often run by teenagers only slightly older than the members, and some parents complained that it took up too much time and damaged schoolwork. This supports the view in Interpretation 2³ that attendance 'was often poor'.

Interpretation 2 is also supported by the evidence of youth groups that rejected the Nazis. By the late 1930s the Edelweiss Pirates⁴ had appeared, mainly in working-class areas of western cities such as Cologne. They wore their own badges, went hiking without permission and sometimes attacked Hitler Youth patrols. In cities such as Hamburg, the Swing Youth, who were mostly middle-class, listened and danced to American jazz and swing music, which the Nazis condemned as degenerate. These groups show that some young people were 'creating their own groups and styles', just as Interpretation 2 says. However, they were small minorities⁵, so they do not prove that most young people rejected the regime.

This is why Interpretation 1 must also be considered. It argues that 'most young Germans welcomed the Hitler Youth', and this is supported by the fact that membership rose rapidly from around 2 million in 1933 to over 5 million by 1936⁶, before membership was compulsory. Activities such as camping, hiking and sport were genuinely attractive, especially for working-class children who had little money for holidays during the Depression. Many girls in the League of German Maidens also valued the chance to take part in activities away from home. Interpretation 1 is therefore more convincing for the period before 1936, when joining was still largely voluntary.

Overall, I agree with Interpretation 2 that the Nazis never won complete loyalty from young people, because compulsory membership reduced enthusiasm and some youth groups openly rejected Nazi values. But I do not fully agree with it, because the rapid voluntary growth of the Hitler Youth shows that many young people were genuinely enthusiastic, at least at first. Interpretation 2 best describes the end of the 1930s; Interpretation 1 best describes the early years⁷.