Conflict & tension 1918–1939

Source B is useful because it shows how bitterly many Germans reacted to the Treaty. It calls the Treaty 'shameful' and a 'disgrace', which matches what I know about German anger at the terms. Under Article 231, the 'war guilt' clause¹, Germany had to accept blame for the war; it lost about 13% of its European territory, including Alsace-Lorraine, and its army was cut to 100,000 men with no air force. Germans also called the Treaty a 'diktat' because their representatives were not allowed to negotiate the terms, only to sign. The provenance makes B even more useful.² It was written by a nationalist newspaper on the very day of the signing, so it captures the immediate emotional reaction. Its purpose was to stir up its readers, so it is one-sided, but this is exactly what makes it useful³: it shows the language of revenge that nationalist groups, and later Hitler, used to attack the Weimar politicians who signed, the so-called 'November Criminals'.

Source C is useful because it shows a different reaction, from the side of the victors. Keynes argues that the Treaty punished Germany rather than rebuilding Europe and that Germany could not pay. This fits my knowledge, as in 1921 the Reparations Commission fixed reparations at £6,600 million⁴, and Germany's failure to keep up payments led to the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. The provenance strengthens its usefulness: Keynes was the Treasury's chief representative at the conference itself, so he had inside knowledge of how the terms were made⁵. However, he resigned in protest, so he wanted to persuade the British public that the Treaty was wrong. His book sold widely, and it helps a historian explain why many British people came to feel the Treaty was unfair, which later contributed to support for appeasement⁶ in the 1930s.

Overall, both sources are useful, but they are most useful together. B shows the fury of German nationalists in 1919, while C shows that even some people in Britain thought the Treaty was too harsh. However, neither shows the French reaction⁷: many in France, including Clemenceau's critics, thought the Treaty was too lenient, so a historian would need other sources to see the full range of reactions.

The Abyssinian Crisis was the most important reason for the League's failure in the 1930s because it destroyed any belief that collective security could stop aggression by a major power. However, it only had this effect because of weaknesses¹ that had already been exposed in Manchuria and which were built into the League from the start.

The Abyssinian Crisis was so damaging because the League's response was weak at the exact moment when it had the chance to act. Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in October 1935, even though both Italy and Abyssinia were League members. The League did condemn Italy and imposed economic sanctions, but they did not include oil², the one sanction that might have halted Italy's war effort, because members feared the USA, which was not a member, would simply sell Italy oil instead. Britain also kept the Suez Canal open, so Italian troops and supplies continued to reach Africa. Then, in December 1935, it was revealed that the British and French foreign ministers had drawn up the secret Hoare–Laval Pact³, which would have given Mussolini a large part of Abyssinia. This showed that the two leading members of the League were more concerned with keeping Mussolini as an ally against Hitler than with upholding the Covenant. As a result, Italy conquered Abyssinia by 1936 and left the League in 1937, and Hitler, who had remilitarised the Rhineland in March 1936 while attention was on Abyssinia, saw that the League would not stand up to aggression.

However, the Manchurian Crisis had already shown these weaknesses, and it set an example that Mussolini followed⁴. After the Mukden Incident in September 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria. The League sent the Lytton Commission, but its report took around a year to appear, and when the League accepted it, Japan simply left the League in 1933 and kept Manchuria⁵. No sanctions were imposed, partly because Japan's main trading partner, the USA, was not a member, and Britain and France had no wish to fight a war so far away. Manchuria is important because it proved that a powerful country could ignore the League without consequences, which made Mussolini more confident that he could do the same.

Both crises failed because of structural weaknesses in the League itself. It had no army of its own, so it depended on Britain and France, who were reluctant to act because of the cost after the First World War and the economic impact of the Great Depression after 1929. Decisions in the Council needed to be unanimous, which made action slow. Above all, the USA never joined⁶, so sanctions were always easy to get around. The Depression also made sanctions less attractive and pushed countries like Japan and Italy to look for new territory and resources.

In conclusion, I largely agree with the statement. The Abyssinian Crisis was the main reason for the League's failure because it was the moment when Britain and France, the League's leading members, openly put their own interests above collective security, and after 1936 no country took the League seriously. However, Abyssinia was the final blow rather than the only cause⁷: the League's structural weaknesses meant it was always likely to fail against a great power, and Manchuria had already shown aggressors that they could get away with it.